级差碳税机制下二级易变质品供应链定价与库存研究
Pricing and Inventory Optimization of Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Deteriorating Items under Differential Carbon Tax Mechanism

基于“碳达峰”目标测算碳排放强度，动态设置碳限额并设计级差碳税机制，针对由单个零售商和单个制造商组成的二级易变质品供应链，考虑需求与货架库存量有关并允许缺货，分别构建分散决策和集中决策下的定价与库存优化模型。运用Stackelberg博弈理论和逆向归纳法，分析两种决策下制造商的最优批发价格和零售商的最优库存。数值实验表明，变质率增加会导致分散决策和集中决策下的最优预期总利润下降，而存货影响因子增加会提高两种决策的预期总利润。单位惩罚碳税对分散决策影响有限，但会显著降低集中决策预期总利润。对比两种决策，集中决策下预期总利润更大，但碳减排效果不如分散决策，可适当提高单位惩罚碳税以降低碳排放量。本文的研究为碳限额与级差碳税机制下的供应链定价与库存决策提供有益启示。
Based on the goal of “peak carbon dioxide emissions”, this study measures carbon emission intensity, dynamically sets a carbon allowance and differential carbon tax mechanism, designs pricing and inventory optimization models under decentralized and centralized decision making for a two-echelon deteriorating items supply chain consisting of a single retailer and a single manufacturer, considering that the demand is related to the amount of shelf inventory and allowing for stock-outs. In addition, this study uses Stackelberg game theory and backward induction, to analyse the optimal wholesale price of the manufacturer and the optimal inventory of the retailer under the two decisions. Numerical experiments show that an increase in the deterioration rate leads to a decrease in the optimal expected profit under both decentralised and centralised decisions, while an increase in the inventory impact factor increases the optimal profit for both decisions. A unit penalty carbon tax has a limited effect on the decentralised decision but significantly reduces the expected profit of the centralised decision. Comparing the two decisions, the optimal profit is larger under the centralised decision, but the carbon emission reduction effect is not as good as the decentralised decision, and the unit penalty carbon tax can be increased appropriately to reduce carbon emissions. The research in this study provides useful insights for supply chain pricing and inventory decisions under the carbon allowance and differential carbon tax mechanisms.