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反垄断视角下平台掠夺性定价的认定规则研究
The Recognition Rules of Platform Predatory Pricing from the Perspective of Antitrust Law

DOI: 10.12677/ds.2024.105246, PP. 15-22

Keywords: 掠夺性定价,双边市场,数字平台,反垄断
Predatory Pricing
, Bilateral Markets, Digital Platforms, Anti-Monopoly

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Abstract:

传统掠夺性定价标准在成本的选择、补偿要件的存废、损害意图标准的可实践性方面本身存在诸多争议,而互联网平台由于其自身的多边性、网络外部性导致掠夺性定价存在更多障碍与困难。本文从国内外理论研究与司法实践入手对互联网平台领域掠夺性定价的认定规则进行分析与构建,认为在认定掠夺性定价行为时,应以具有市场支配地位为前提,回归价格成本关系以平均可避免成本为基准对各市场中的加权成本与加权价格进行衡量,同时辅之以补偿可能性测试和损害意图标准进行认定。
The traditional predatory pricing standards face controversies in cost selection, the validity of compensation criteria, and the practicability of the intent to harm standard. Internet platforms, due to their multilateral nature and network externalities, encounter more obstacles and difficulties in predatory pricing. This article analyzes and constructs rules for determining predatory pricing in the internet platform sector based on both domestic and international theoretical research and judicial practice. It suggests that when identifying predatory pricing behavior, it should be premised on having a dominant market position, returning to the cost relationship by using average avoidable cost as a benchmark to assess the weighted costs and prices in each marginal market. This should be accompanied by a possibility of compensation test and the intent to harm standard for determination.

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