康德的来世幸福是可演绎的吗？
Can Kant’s Future Life Happiness Be Deducted?

在康德哲学中，幸福问题总是围绕着其道德神学部分展开，对幸福概念的分类的阐释工作是必要的。本文试图通过论证康德幸福概念中的矛盾与复杂性，并进一步将幸福概念与康德对来世的思索进行考察，而对作为自然目的的幸福与作为恩宠之国的来世结合的来世幸福的“演绎”可能会引起理性的僭越，从而导致先验幻相的产生，陷入两难境地。因此，必须阐明来世幸福的实践理性预设的性质，以避免成为第一批判的对象。
In Kantian philosophy, the question of happiness always revolves around its theological-moral part, and the interpretation of the classification of the concept of happiness is necessary. This article attempts to demonstrate the contradictions and complexities in Kant’s concept of happiness, and further examines the concept of happiness in relation to Kant’s contemplation of the future life, but in the context of the combination of happiness as a natural end and the happiness of future life associated with the kingdom of grace, the “deduction” of future life happiness intertwined with the purpose of nature may give rise to a rational transgression, leading to the emergence of transcendental illusion and entangling one in antinomy. Therefore, it is imperative to elucidate the nature of the practical rational postulate of future life happiness in order to avoid becoming the subject of the first critique.