绿色供应链金融中规避信用风险的演化博弈研究
A Study on the Avoidance of Credit Risk in Green Supply Chain Finance through an Evolutionary Game Approach

本文研究围绕核心企业、上游中小企业、商业银行三方，分析两两之间的博弈关系。从定量的角度去分析各主体的策略选择，从绿色生产利润、违约处罚数额以及绿色生产投入等变量的角度分析核心企业是否会与中小企业联合骗取绿色贷款以及在何种条件下商业银行愿意进行绿色贷款并成功规避风险。通过演化博弈的手段，进行案例仿真分析，针对绿色供应链金融模式现存问题提出较为全面的优化建议，为环保行业内其他企业践行绿色供应链金融提供了实际案例参考。
This paper focuses on the game relationship between core enterprises, upstream SMEs, and commercial banks. It analyzes the strategic choices of each subject quantitatively, considering variables such as green production profit, default penalty amount, and green production input. The analysis aims to determine whether core enterprises will collude with small and medium-sized enterprises to fraudulently obtain green loans and under what conditions commercial banks are willing to provide green loans while effectively managing risks. Through evolutionary game theory and case simulation analysis, this study proposes comprehensive optimization suggestions for existing issues in the green supply chain finance model. These findings serve as a practical reference for other companies in the environmental protection industry seeking to implement green supply chain finance.