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Dispute Settlement 2024
劳动力市场下互不挖人协议的反垄断法规制
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Abstract:
为降低用人成本减少人才流失,相关市场的经营者间联合通过互不挖人协议的形式限制劳动力市场中人力资源的自由流通,但协议同时也减少了劳动者福利增长的重要渠道,不合理地降低了资源的优化配置,阻碍创新、降低社会福祉。面对我国劳动力市场的激烈竞争和劳动者的不断申诉,我国《反垄断法》应在借鉴域外国家反垄断审查经验的基础上,在判断互不挖人协议违法时遵循本身违法原则,对于部分特殊情况以合理原则作为补充,在界定相关市场时应根据协议制定的时间背景综合判断,充分发挥《反垄断法》的作用,保护市场竞争,维护劳动力市场的健康活力。
In order to reduce the cost of employment and the loss of talents, the operators in the relevant market jointly restrict the free flow of human resources in the labor market by means of non- poaching agreement, but the agreement also reduces the important channel for the growth of workers’ welfare, unreasonably reduces the optimal allocation of resources, hinders innovation and reduces social welfare. In the face of the fierce competition in China’s labor market and the continuous complaints from workers, China’s Antimonopoly Law should, on the basis of the antimonopoly review experience of overseas countries, follow the principle of per se violation in judging the violation of the agreement on non-digging, supplemented by the principle of reasonableness in some special cases, and make comprehensive judgments based on the time and background of the establishment of the agreement in defining the relevant market, so as to give full play to the function of the Antimonopoly Law and protect market competition and safeguard the welfare of the labor market. The Antimonopoly Law should be brought into full play to protect market competition and maintain the healthy vitality of the labor market.
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