网络货运市场中承运人代理模式均衡策略研究
Research on the Equilibrium Strategy of Carrier Agency Mode in the Network Freight Market

在网络货运市场上，承运人可以通过传统的货运平台提供运输，也可以通过建立其他在线预订方式来占有原来的货运市场。同时，货运平台也可以通过独家代理或混合代理的方式与承运人合作。本研究运用博弈论模型来研究承运人占有与货运平台策略之间的相互作用。本文观察到，只有当潜在市场较小的承运人占有时，才会出现原本与潜在市场较大的承运人联系的货运平台成为唯一选择的混合代理的情况。除此之外，只有满足代理费用较低或替代程度较高的情况下，两个货运平台同时考虑混合代理的概率才相对较小。然而，影响各载体是否侵犯的因素存在显著差异。对于潜在市场较小的承运人，代理费是最重要的决定因素，而另一方则更关注替代程度。
In the online freight market, carriers can provide transportation through traditional freight platforms, or they can occupy the original freight market by establishing other online booking methods. At the same time, freight platforms can also work with carriers through exclusive agents or hybrid agents. This study uses a game theory model to study the interaction between carrier possession and freight platform strategies. This paper observes that it is only when a carrier with a smaller potential market is in possession that a freight platform that would otherwise be connected to a carrier with a larger potential market becomes the only hybrid agent of choice. Inaddition, only when the agent cost is lower or the degree of substitution is higher, the probability of the two freight platforms considering hybrid agents at the same time is relatively small. However, there are significant differences in the factors influencing whether each vector is invasive. For carriers with a smaller potential market, agency fees are the most important determining factor, while the other party is more concerned about the degree of substitution.