可信度过剩的证词非正义可能性探析
Analysis on the Possibility of Testimonial Injustice with Excess Credibility

自弗里克在认知理论领域中提出认知非正义概念以来，对于此类认识论和伦理学融合的学术讨论便围绕此概念集中进行，其中对因社会身份偏见刻板印象所造成的“证词非正义”的讨论，都集中于社会身份负面的偏见刻板印象导致的听者将说者的证词可信度贬低而造成的认知非正义形式，且并不认为因社会身份正面的偏见刻板印象导致的对说者的证词可信度过剩而造成的危害属于“证词非正义”，本文将逐步从弗里克否认可信度过剩的证词非正义的理由、可信度过剩的证词非正义支持条件与可信度过剩导致的证词非正义危害几个部分来讨论可信度过剩的证词非正义何以成为可能，并以此种可能性使得证词非正义理论的概念更加充分。
Since Fricker put forward the concept of cognitive injustice in the field of cognitive theory, the aca-demic discussion on the integration of epistemology and ethics has focused on this concept. The discussion of the “testimony injustice” caused by social bias stereotype has focused on the form of cognitive injustice caused by the negative social bias stereotype which leads the listener to devalue the credibility of the speaker’s testimony, and does not consider the harm caused by the excessive credibility of the speaker’s testimony caused by the positive social bias stereotype as “testimony injustice”. In this paper, we will gradually discuss the reasons for the denial of the testimony injus-tice with excess credibility, the supporting conditions of the testimony injustice with excess credi-bility and the harm of the testimony injustice caused by the excess credibility, and this possibility makes the concept of the theory of injustice of testimony more adequate.