消费评论影响下的带有损失厌恶的最优策略
Optimal Strategy with Loss Aversion under Consumer Review

在消费者损失厌恶的线上消费者评论模型中，卖家可以在顾客购买决策之前选择是否披露产品信息，同时顾客可以通过线上消费者评论了解产品信息。本文从顾客能否利用卖家披露的信息的角度将顾客分为专家顾客和新手顾客。当卖家披露产品信息时，专家顾客可以从卖家披露的信息中明确掌握产品价值，新手顾客只能依靠线上消费者评论获取的信息结合自身的损失厌恶心理更新对产品的估值。当卖家不披露信息时，专家顾客和新手顾客都依靠线上消费者评论和自身损失厌恶心理更新估值。本文研究了卖家在有无线上消费者评论时的最优定价策略，分析了卖家的最优披露决策，得到了存在线上消费者评论时卖家的均衡解。
In the online consumer review model with loss-averse consumers, sellers have the option to disclose product information before customers make purchasing decisions, while customers can learn about product details through online consumer reviews. This study categorizes customers into expert customers and novice customers based on their ability to utilize the disclosed information from sellers. When sellers disclose product information, expert customers can clearly understand the product value from the disclosed information, whereas novice customers can only rely on information obtained from online consumer reviews, combined with their own loss-aversion psychology, to update their product valuations. When sellers do not disclose information, both expert and novice customers rely on online consumer reviews and their own loss-aversion psychology to update their valuations. This paper explores the optimal pricing strategy for sellers in the presence or absence of online consumer reviews, analyzes the optimal disclosure decisions made by sellers, and derives the equilibrium solution for sellers when online consumer reviews exist.