碳税政策下碳减排对原/再制造商决策的影响研究
Research on the Effects of Carbon Reduction on the Decisions of Original/Remanufacturers with Carbon Tax Policy

在政府征收碳税的背景下，将消费者低碳偏好考虑在内，针对原制造商无碳减排、实施碳减排两种情形，分别构建原制造商和再制造商组成的Stackelberg博弈模型，探讨碳税、消费者低碳偏好和碳减排对两者决策的影响。结果表明：碳税会损害原制造商的利润，当再制造减排系数与新产品和再制造品竞争强度的比值大于某一值时，碳税使再制造商的利润增加；消费者低碳意识越强对原制造商越有利；碳减排会使新产品的销售量增加，原制造商的利润增加；碳减排不会影响再制造商的逆向供应链，但当碳税税率与消费者低碳偏好的比值大于某一值时，再制造品的销售量和再制造商的利润将会减少。
In the context of government carbon tax collection, taking into account consumer low-carbon preferences, a Stackelberg game model consisting of original manufacturers and remanufacturers is constructed to explore the impact of carbon tax, consumer low-carbon preferences, and carbon reduction on their decisions in two scenarios: no carbon reduction by original manufac-turers and implementation of carbon reduction. The results indicate that carbon tax will harm the profits of original manufacturers. When the ratio of remanufacturing carbon emission reduction coefficient to the competition intensity of new and remanufactured products is greater than a certain value, carbon tax will increase the profits of remanufacturing manufacturers; The stronger the consumer’s low-carbon awareness, the more advantageous it is for the original manufacturer; Carbon reduction will increase the sales volume of new products and increase the profits of original manufacturers; Carbon reduction will not affect the reverse supply chain of remanufacturers, but when the ratio of carbon tax rates to consumer low-carbon preferences exceeds a certain value, the sales volume of remanufactured products and the profits of remanufacturers will decrease.