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Can AI Become Judge Hercules?

DOI: 10.4236/blr.2023.144113, PP. 2041-2053

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Adjudication, Integrity, Dworkin, Ruth Chang

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Abstract:

The commonly held belief that artificial intelligence cannot engage in value comparison within the judicial process is rooted in Hart’s analysis of judicial discretion. This view is, however, contested by Dworkin’s “law’s integrity” theory. According to Dworkin’s legal theory, the adjudication process involves constructive interpretation, aiming for a single best answer, as integrity serves as the exclusive standard for resolving any disputes over values. Consequently, judges do not possess discretion in the sense described by Hart. This article goes on to delve into the specifics of integrity, formalizing it into a series of formulas, thereby enabling AI to comprehend and apply it.

References

[1]  Chang, R. (2002). Making Comparisons Count. Psychology Press.
[2]  Di Thommazo, A., Rovina, R. et al. (2014). Using Artificial Intelligence Techniques to Enhance Traceability Links. In S. Hammoudi, L. Maciaszek, & J. Cordeiro (Eds.), Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems (Vol. 2). Science and Technology Publications.
[3]  Dworkin, R. (1985). A Matter of Principle. Oxford University Press.
https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1pncpxk
[4]  Dworkin, R. (1986). Law’s Empire. Harvard University Press.
[5]  Hart, H. L. (1983). Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198253884.001.0001
[6]  Michael, A. (1996). A Discourse on Law and Artificial Intelligence. Law Technology Journal, 5, No. 1.

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