康德对休谟问题的回应——一个对弗里德曼的强读的反驳
Kant’s Reply to Hume—A Critique of Friedman’s Strong Reading

学界对康德的“经验的第二类比”的效力问题采取了弱读与强读两种解读。弱读认为它仅仅解决了因果问题，强读认为它还进一步解决了归纳问题(即特殊经验性规律的实存)。但强读的一个基本论据，即对因果观念的理解，是成问题的，它失败于区分对主体而言的普遍性与对客体而言的普遍性。而且这两者不能等同，也就是说，先验统觉凭之产生对象统一性的那个规则的普遍性不可能现实地等同于经验性概念所具有规则的普遍性，因为康德在第一批判与《逻辑学》中都指出，后者仅仅描述了对象的部分特征，或者说它不是对象的实在定义。第三批判中的相关说法也会表明，看起来最明显支持强读的一句原文也许只是康德的论述策略，又或者，他在第三批判时凭借反思判断力理论才真正肯定，我们只能范导性地承认特殊经验性规律的实存。
Scholar shave adopted two interpretations of the validity of Kant’s “second analogy of experience”: A weak reading and a strong reading. The weak reading believes that Kant only solved the problem of causation, while the strong reading believes that it further solves the problem of induction (that is, the existence of particular empirical laws). But a basic argument of strong reading, that is, the understanding of the concept of causation, is problematic. It fails to distinguish between universality for subjects and universality for objects. Moreover, the two cannot be equated, that is to say, the universality of the rule by which transcendental apperception produces the unity of objects cannot realistically be equated with the universality of the rule possessed by empirical concepts, because Kant had pointed out that the latter only describes part of the characteristics of the object, or it is not the actual definition of the object. Relevant statements in the Third Critique will also show that the original sentence that seems to be the most obvious support for strong reading may be just Kant’s argumentative strategy, or he truly affirmed it with the theory of reflective judgment in the Third Critique. We can only regularly admit the existence of particular empirical laws.