This article delves into the intricate relationship between cognitive
science and embodied cognition, offering transformative philosophical insights
with profound implications for our understanding of the mind-body connection.
In response to the journal’s feedback, we have enhanced the abstract to provide
a more comprehensive overview of our study.Background:
We trace the historical evolution of ideas, from the inception of cognitive
science rooted in analytic philosophy to the groundbreaking contributions of
Rodney Brooks and others in the field of artificial intelligence. We also
explore the work of scholars such as Agre, Chapman, and Dreyfus, shedding light
on the role of cognitive metaphor and the concept of the cognitive unconscious
in shaping our understanding of embodied cognition.Purpose: Our study aims to shed light on the central
theme that unites these various strands of thought—the rejection of the
traditional, transcendental view of the subject in favor of the concept of an
embodied subject. This embodied subject actively engages with its environment,
shaping consciousness and cognition. This shift in perspective challenges
classical epistemological theories and opens new avenues for inquiry.Method: We have conducted a comprehensive literature
review to explore the historical development and key concepts in the field of
embodied cognition, with a particular focus on the philosophical underpinnings
and their integration into cognitive science.Results:
Our examination of embodied cognition reveals that the mind is intimately
connected to the body, with cognition emerging through interactions with the
environment and perceptual experiences. This
perspective challenges reductionist notions and demonstrates that mental
states cannot be reduced to brain states alone. We also explore the
relationship between functionalism and computational states of the brain,
illustrating that mental states can be understood in the context of
mathematical functions.Conclusion:
In conclusion, this paper highlights the profound implications of embodied
cognition and suggests that the mind is not isolated from the body but
intimately
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