董事网络位置对股价崩盘风险的影响
The Impact of Directors’ Network Position on the Risk of a Stock Price Crash

董事网络是董事治理公司的重要资本，其对公司治理效果的影响备受关注。以2007~2021年中国沪深A股上市公司为样本，研究对象为公司董事，从董事网络视角出发，从广度和深度两个角度考察了董事不同类型的网络中心度对股价崩盘风险的影响。研究表明：公司董事的网络中心度在广度上越高，越能降低股价崩盘的风险，而深度的网络中心度对股价崩盘风险影响不明显。这种影响通过资源效应和学习效应传导。进一步研究发现，这种影响在大股东持股比例高的公司显著，而大股东持股比例低的组不显著。在非国有企业显著，在国有企业则不显著。综合研究结论，董事网络是影响董事治理公司的重要因素，这种影响通过董事在网络中获得社会资本，随公司治理环境不同存在差异。
Director network is an important capital for directors to govern the company, and its impact on the effectiveness of corporate governance has attracted much attention. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2021, the study targets company directors and examines the impact of different types of network centrality of directors on the risk of stock price collapse from both breadth and depth perspectives from the perspective of directors’ networks. The study shows that the higher the network centrality of company directors in terms of breadth reduces the risk of stock price collapse, while the network centrality in terms of depth has an insignificant effect on the risk of stock price collapse. This effect is transmitted through the resource effect and the learning effect. It is further found that this effect is significant in firms with a high percentage of majority shareholders’ ownership, while it is not significant in the group with a low percentage of majority shareholders’ ownership. It is significant in non-state-owned firms and insignificant in state-owned firms. Taken together, the study concludes that directors’ network is an important factor influencing directors’ governance of companies, and this effect varies with the corporate governance environment through directors’ access to social capital in the network.