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自动驾驶汽车法律地位辨析
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Abstract:
有关自动驾驶汽车法律地位的界定引发学界热议,集中体现在自动驾驶汽车究竟是法律主体抑或是法律客体的问题。一方面,作为智能机器人的自动驾驶汽车因其具有的高度自主性、自我学习能力、自我决策能力和执行能力等特征,有学者倾向于将自动驾驶汽车拟制为“人”,使其具有法律主体地位,但该种学说下设计的法律规则应对智能机器人侵权时产生的法律责任规则不具有制度上的优越性。从技术角度、社会伦理角度和法律角度出发,当前自动驾驶汽车不宜将其界定为法律主体,应将其纳入法律客体范畴。
The definition of the legal status of autonomous vehicle has aroused heated debate in the aca-demic circle, which is mainly reflected in the question of whether autonomous vehicle is legal subjects or legal objects. On the one hand, because of the high autonomy, self-learning ability, self-decision-making ability and executive ability of autonomous vehicle as an intelligent robot, some scholars tend to create autonomous vehicle as a “person”, so that it has the status of legal subjects. However, the legal rules designed under this theory do not have institutional advantages in dealing with the legal liability rules generated by intelligent robot infringement. From the perspective of technology, social ethics and law, autonomous vehicle should not be defined as legal subjects at present, but should be included in the category of legal objects.
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