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博弈论在流域生态补偿转移支付中的应用与启示
Application and Enlightenment of Game Theory in Watershed Ecological Compensation Transfer Payment

DOI: 10.12677/ISL.2023.73013, PP. 86-94

Keywords: 流域生态补偿,博弈论,动态博弈,政策建议
River Basin Ecological Compensation
, Game Theory, Dynamic Game, Policy Suggestions

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Abstract:

为了实现生态环境利益分配公平正义的法治目标,解决利益分配失衡的问题,研究流域生态补偿中的政府间博弈问题,本研究构建了一个三方动态博弈模型,分析了流域上下游地方政府与中央政府之间的利益冲突和合作动机,探讨了不同情形下各方的最优策略和均衡结果,并提出了相应的政策建议。为了实现流域水环境保护的最优水平,需要各方的协调和合作,横向转移支付比纵向转移支付更有利于流域内部的生态产品供需关系和价值实现,中央政府应该建立专门的横向转移支付管理机构,促进流域协同治理能力。
In order to achieve the legal goal of fair and just distribution of ecological and environmental bene-fits and solve the problem of unbalanced distribution of benefits, the intergovernmental game problem in watershed ecological compensation was studied, a three-party dynamic game model was constructed, and the relationship between local governments and the central government in the upper and lower reaches of the watershed was analyzed. This article explores the optimal strategies and equilibrium results of various parties in different situations, and proposes corresponding policy recommendations. In order to achieve the optimal level of water environment protection in the ba-sin, the coordination and cooperation of all parties are required. Compared with vertical transfer payment, horizontal transfer payment is more conducive to the supply and demand relationship and value realization of ecological products within the basin. The central government should estab-lish a special horizontal transfer payment management institution to promote collaborative river basin governance capabilities.

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