麦金太尔实践德性论新释——基于人主体实践性原则的一种疏解
A New Interpretation of MacIntyre’s Theory of Practical Virtue—An Interpretation Based on the Practical Principle of Human Subject

实践是麦金太尔德性论的解释路径，理解麦氏德性伦理学的关键在于理解实践范畴，麦金太尔的德性论实际上是一种实践德性论。麦金太尔通过拓展实践范畴、采用历史主义的视角、回溯传统等方式建构统一性德性的尝试在相当程度上使得其实践德性论获得了自洽和普遍性，但没有根本回应道德相对主义的设疑。所以，需要从形式上设立一种具有普遍性意义的原则——主体实践性原则来疏解麦氏实践德性论所面临的道德相对主义的伦理困境。
Practice is the interpretive approach of Alasdair MacIntyre’s theory of virtue. The key to under-stand McIntyre’s ethics of virtue is to understand the category of practice. MacIntyre’s theory of virtue is actually a practical theory of virtue. McIntyre’s attempts to construct unified virtue by expanding the scope of practice, adopting the perspective of historicism and looking back to tradition have made his theory of practical virtue self-consistent and universal to a considerable extent, but he has not fundamentally responded to the doubts of moral relativism. Therefore, it is necessary to set up a principle with universal meaning in form-the principle of subject practice to relieve the ethical dilemma of moral relativism faced by McCormack’s theory of practical virtue.