少数股权收购的经营者集中规制研究
Study on the Regulation of Operator Concentration in Minority Equity Acquisition

少数股权收购行为常见于各行业。在投融资领域，以少数股权收购的方式进行投资是非常典型的投资方式，其长期以来未受到经营者集中制度关注，而在近几年强化反垄断要求下则发生了变化。少数股权收购行为分为控制性少数股权收购和非控制性少数股权收购，其中控制性少数股权收购行为又分为积极控制和消极控制下的少数股权收购。少数股权收购行为可能存在三种反竞争效应：单边效应、协同效应和封锁效应。美国对于少数股权的收购控制，以其立法和案例作出了良好的示范。我国目前的经营者集中反垄断审查制度以控制变更作为审查标准，立法上没有规制存在反竞争效应的非控制性少数股权的空间，同时可能导致实务中执法机关过度引申“控制”的解释内涵。我国应当调整反垄断执法标准，将存在反竞争效应的非控制性少数股权收购行为也纳入经营者集中审查标准。
Minority shareholding acquisition is commonly seen in all lines of business. In the field of investment and financing, it’s a very typical method of investment to acquire a minority shareholdings of the target company, and for a long time, it is not been watched by China’s Concentration of Undertakings System, that changed when China’s atmosphere calls for reinforce Antitrust in recent years. Minority shareholding acquisition can be divided into controlling minority shareholding acquisition and non-controlling minority shareholding acquisition, of which controlling minority shareholding acquisition is divided into active controlling minority shareholding acquisition and negative con-trolling minority shareholding acquisition. Minority shareholding acquisition can have three anti-competitive effects: Unilateral Effects, Synergy Effects, and Blocking Effects. The United States has set a good example of minority ownership control with its legislation and cases. China’s current Concentration of Undertakings System takes “change of control” as the review standard, and there is no room for regulating non-controlling minority shareholdings with anti-competitive effects in legislation, which may lead to misinterpretation of the concept “control” by enforcement agency in practice. China should adjust its Concentration of Undertakings System standard to include non-controlling minority equity acquisitions with anti-competitive effects.