上海市静态管理期间哄抬价格行为产生原因及监管路径研究——以“天价跑腿”为例
Research on the Causes of Price Gouging during Static Management and the Supervision Path in Shanghai—Taking “Sky-High Price of Errands” as an Example

新冠疫情发生后，上海市曾采取全域静态管理。在静态管理过程中出现了消费者需求暴增、跑腿价格飞涨现象，产生哄抬价格行为。哄抬价格本身具有道德风险和效率属性特点。“天价跑腿”商品属性特殊，文章借助进销差价率综合认定哄抬价格、垄断价格负外部性等经济学问题。不合理的价格会损害消费者相关利益，由此带来社会无谓损失。研究通过哄抬价格经济相关理论分析上海市静态管理期间的“天价跑腿”现象，得出结论：在供需关系下，商品特殊属性、市场价格垄断是哄抬价格行为产生重要原因。在此分析路径基础上，从认定标准、技术赋能、基本供应等方面提出相关监管建议。
After the new crown epidemic occurred, Shanghai adopted a region-wide static management. In the process of static management, there was a surge in consumer demand, and the price of errands soared, generating price gouging behavior. Price gouging itself is characterized by moral hazard and efficiency attributes. “Sky-high price of errands” commodity property is special, the article identifies price gouging, price monopoly negative externality and other economic issues with the help of the price differential. Unreasonable prices can damage the interests of consumers and bring unnecessary losses to society. The study analyzes the phenomenon of “sky-high price of errands” during the static management period in Shanghai through theories related to the price gouging economy, and concludes that the special attributes of commodities under the supply-demand relationship and market price monopoly are important causes of price gouging behavior. On the basis of this analysis, government regulation is proposed in terms of identification criteria, technology empowerment and basic supply.