保荐机构跟投成本、审计师行业专长与公司盈余管理
Cost of Sponsor’s Co-Investment, Auditor Industry Specialization and Corporate Earnings Management

保荐跟投制度的设立在持续督导期内能否有效抑制保荐机构的机会主义行为，对上市公司的盈余管理行为进行有效约束，是一个需要关注的问题。本文以2019年至2021年科创板上市公司为研究对象，分析上市当年和上市第二年保荐机构跟投成本对科创板上市公司盈余管理行为的影响，并检验审计师行业专长的调节作用。实证结果表明，在科创板公司上市当年，保荐机构会更好地发挥自身的监督作用，抑制被保荐上市公司的盈余管理活动；在科创板公司上市第二年，出于未来12个月内减持股份的动机，保荐机构反而会放松自身的督导工作甚至参与到上市公司的盈余管理活动中。结合审计师行业专长的调节效应发现，上市当年审计师行业专长和保荐机构的监督工作有着替代作用。本文较早地研究了跟投制度对企业盈余管理的影响，为进一步完善科创板创新制度、更好地发挥第三方机构的监督作用提供了一定思路。
Whether the establishment of the co-investment system can effectively curb the opportunistic behavior of sponsors and effectively restrict the earnings management behavior of listed companies during the continuous supervision period is a problem that needs attention. This paper takes the listed companies of Science and Technology Innovation Board from 2019 to 2021 as the research object, and studies the impact of the cost of sponsor’s co-investment on the earnings management behavior of listed companies of Science and Technology Innovation Board in the year of listing and the second year of listing, and tests the moderating effect of auditor industry specialization. The empirical results show that in the first year of listing, the sponsors will play a better role in their supervision and inhibit the earnings management activities of the sponsored listed companies; in the second year of listing, the sponsors will relax their super-vision and even participate in the earnings management activities of the listed companies out of the motivation of reducing their shares in the next 12 months. Combined with the moderating effect of auditor industry specialization, it is found that auditor industry specialization and the supervision of sponsors play a substitute role in the year of listing. This paper studies the impact of the system of follow-up investment on the earnings management of enterprises earlier, which provides some ideas for further improving the innovation system of the Science and Technology Innovation Board and better playing the supervisory role of third-party institutions.