宗族文化对企业创新的异质性影响研究
Research on the Heterogeneity Influence of Clan Culture on Enterprise Innovation

创新是科技发展和社会进步的根本动力。20世纪80年代，改革开放初期，经济法律体制不够完善，企业创新的正外部性得不到有效的补偿，因此造成了我国企业创新不足的局面。近年来，随着市场环境的完善，制度、法律层面对企业创新的约束作用已经越来越小，文化层次更深远和隐蔽的作用开始凸显。宗族是文化的显性标志，本文从宗族视角研究企业创新问题。宗族内部信任程度高，族中的显赫人士也自然的承担起兴旺宗族、辅助宗亲的任务，这些文化传统使宗族氛围浓厚的企业多任用宗亲，支持宗族的公共事业，进而降低了企业的创新投入与创新效率。本文基于中国工业企业数据库，采用tobit模型和probit模型回归。tobit模型回归结果显示：每万人拥有族谱数每增加一个，企业的创新绩效减少0.00076。此外，本文还根据企业产权性质与行业性质分样本回归，结果表明：宗族只对私营企业和非高科技企业的创新绩效有负作用。根据宗族强度中位数划分强宗族区和弱宗族区，并与政府补贴强度做交互项进行回归，结果显示宗族对政府补贴效应没有调节作用。本文从宗族文化角度对企业创新绩效差异提供新的解读，对新时代如何促进企业创新、促进地区均衡发展提供了有益思考。本文强调，市场化、法制化、规范化才是企业做大做强的关键。
Innovation is the fundamental driving force of technology development and social progress. In the 1980s, reform and opening up have just begun. The economic system and laws were imperfect. The positive externalities of enterprise innovation could not be effectively compensated. The market environment has greatly improved recently. Institutional and legal restrictions on enterprise innovation are becoming smaller and smaller, culture begins to highlight. Clan is the dominant sign of culture. This paper studies enterprise innovation from the clan insight. Due to the high degree of trust within the clan, prominent people in the clan also naturally assumed the task of thriving and assisting the clan. These cultural traditions made the enterprises with strong clan atmosphere employ more clan members and support the clan’s public undertakings, thus reducing the innovation investment and innovation efficiency of the enterprises. Our research is based on the database of Chinese industrial enterprises. According to the data characteristics, this paper adopts the tobit model and probit model. The regression results of the tobit model showed that for every increase in the number of genealogies per 10 000 people, the innovation performance of the en-terprises decreased by 0.00076. In addition, according to the property right character and industry character of enterprises, the samples are divided and studied respectively. The results show that clan only inhibits the innovation performance of private enterprises and non-high-tech enterprises. Strong clan areas and weak clan areas were divided according to the median of clan strength, and the interaction item was made with the intensity of government subsidy. The results show that the clan does not regulate the effect of subsidies. This paper provides a new interpretation of the differences in enterprise innovation performance from the perspective of clan culture, and provides useful thinking on how to promote enterprise innovation and regional balanced development in the new era. This paper