分析师关注、内部控制质量与商誉泡沫
Analyst Concern, Internal Control Quality and Goodwill Bubble

本文选取我国2007~2020年2159家A股上市公司数据为样本，实证检验了分析师关注、内部控制质量对企业商誉泡沫的影响。结果表明，分析师关注、内部控制质量对商誉泡沫具有抑制作用，分析师关注度和内部控制质量越高，企业商誉泡沫越少，但分析师关注不能提高内部控制对商誉泡沫的抑制作用。因此，企业应完善内部控制制度、加强内部控制质量，接受分析师追踪关注。投资者要结合目标企业的分析师关注度及分析师出具的分析报告做出合理决策。政府则应加强对并购重组活动中内部控制的相关监管与惩罚力度，意识到分析师关注在改善市场信息环境中的关键作用，推动相关的法规和团队建设。
This paper selects the data of 2159 A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2020 as samples to empirically test the impact of analyst concern and internal control quality on corporate goodwill bubble. The results show that analyst concern and internal control quality can restrain goodwill bubble, the higher the analyst concern and internal control quality is, the less goodwill bubble is, but analyst concern can not improve the inhibitory effect of internal control on goodwill bubble. Therefore, enterprises should improve the internal control system, strengthen the quality of internal control, and accept the follow-up concern of analysts. Investors should make reasonable decisions by combining the analyst concern of the target company and the analysis report issued by the analyst. On the other hand, the government should strengthen the supervision and punishment of internal control in M & A activities, realize the key role of analyst concern in improving the market information environment, and promote relevant regulations and team building.