论人工智能刑事主体地位之否定
On the Negation of the Criminal Subject Status of Artificial Intelligence

对于是否应当赋予人工智能刑事责任主体地位在学者间展开了论战。本文从赋予人工智能刑事责任主体地位的前提、资格、目的与风险四个方面进行审视，认为是否能够真正实现强人工智能尚且无法知晓、其意志不具有社会规范属性、对其实施刑罚无法达到刑罚目的以及存在颠覆人类主体地位、不受约束等风险，其刑事主体地位不适格。涉及人工智能的犯罪行为所主要发生的财务管理、自动驾驶及医疗领域的刑事责任的承担需视情况而定。
There is a debate among scholars on whether artificial intelligence should be given the status of subject of criminal responsibility. This paper examines the premise, qualification, purpose and risk of giving artificial intelligence the status of subject of criminal responsibility, and believes that whether it can truly realize strong artificial intelligence is still unknown, its will does not have the attribute of social norms, its punishment cannot achieve the purpose of punishment, and there are risks of subverting the human subject status and not being constrained, and its criminal subject status is not eligible. The criminal responsibility in the fields of financial management, automatic driving and medical care, which mainly occur in criminal acts involving artificial intelligence, shall depend on the situation.