管理层能力对企业非效率投资的抑制作用研究——基于融资约束视野
Research on the Inhibiting Effect of Management Ability on Corporate Inefficiency Investment—Based on the Perspective of Financial Constraint

本文以2011~2020我国沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本，实证检验了管理层能力对企业非效率投资的影响以及作用机制，研究发现：1) 管理层能力对企业非效率投资具有显著的抑制作用，管理层所具备的经营管理能力越高，不仅可以抑制企业投资过度还可以缓解企业投资不足，从而降低企业的非效率投资水平。2) 融资约束在管理层能力与企业非效率投资之间承担部分中介效应，管理层能力对企业非效率投资产生的抑制作用有一部分是通过融资约束进行传导的。3) 高管内部薪酬差距的加大会增强管理层能力对企业非效率投资的抑制作用，而高管外部薪酬差距的加大则会削弱管理层能力对企业非效率投资的抑制作用。4) 在进一步研究中还发现，管理层能力对非国有、市场竞争程度低以及经济政策不确定性低企业非效率投资的抑制作用更强。
This paper conducts an empirical analysis on the impact of management capacity on corporate inefficiency investment and its mechanism by using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2020. The research findings are as follows: 1) The management ability has a significant inhibitory effect on the inefficiency investment of enterprises. The higher the management ability of the management, it can not only restrain the overinvestment of enterprises but also alleviate the underinvestment of enterprises, so as to reduce the inefficiency investment level of enterprises. 2) The financing constraints in the management ability and enterprise bear partial intermediary effect between the efficiency of investment, the management ability of an adverse effect the efficiency of the enterprise investment is part of the conduction through the financing constraints. 3) The increase of the internal executive compensation gap will enhance the inhibitory effect of management ability on the inefficiency investment, while the increase of the external executive compensation gap will weaken the inhibitory effect of management ability on the inefficiency investment. 4) In further research, it is also found that the management ability has a stronger inhibitory effect on the inefficiency investment of non-state-owned enterprises, enterprises with low degree of market competition and economic policy uncertainty.