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二元治理衡平与PPP争议治理效果
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Abstract:
以中国社会经济情境下的PPP模式为研究对象，针对当前国内部分PPP项目争议频发情况，通过实证研究分析契约治理和关系治理组成的二元治理结构对PPP争议治理效果所发挥的作用，并考察制度治理的调节作用。研究发现：契约治理和关系治理组成的二元治理结构对争议治理效果有显著的正向影响，同时制度治理调节了二元治理对争议治理效果的影响作用水平：在制度激励条件下，契约治理作用水平较低而关系治理作用水平较高；在制度抑制条件下，契约治理作用水平较高而关系治理作用水平较低。研究明确了当前中国PPP模式应由快速发展转变为高质量发展，并进一步重视二元治理体系对改善PPP项目争议治理效果的重要作用；确立了制度治理应在制度激励导向和制度抑制导向中取得平衡，以实现二元治理体系对PPP项目争议治理效果的最大贡献水平。
This paper takes the PPP model in China’s social and economic context as the research object, and conducts research on the frequent disputes of some domestic PPP projects. An empirical study was carried out to analyze the role of the dual governance structure composed of contractual gov-ernance and relational governance in the governance effect of PPP disputes, and to examine the regulatory role of institutional governance. The research finds that the dual governance structure composed of contractual governance and relational governance has a significant positive impact on the effectiveness of dispute governance. At the same time, the paper also finds that institutional governance regulates the impact of dual governance on the effectiveness of dispute governance: under the condition of institutional incentives, the role of contractual governance is low while that of relational governance is high; Under the condition of institutional restraint, the role of contract governance is higher than that of relationship governance. The study clarified that the current PPP model in China should change from rapid development to high-quality development, and suggested that further attention should be paid to the important role of the dual governance system in improving the governance effect of PPP project disputes. A policy reference was proposed that the establishment of institutional governance should achieve a balance between institutional incentive orientation and institutional inhibition orientation to achieve the maximum contribution of the dual governance system to the governance effect of PPP project disputes.
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