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PPP项目协议争端演进路径研究——多重中介效应分析
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Abstract:
为研究PPP项目协议争端演进路径，解决PPP项目协议争端频发问题并完善PPP项目治理，开展实证研究。针对一系列典型PPP项目，面向PPP项目管理人员回收394份问卷并对理论模型和研究假设进行实证检验。结果显示，契约不完全条件下协议签订主体通过一系列契约对抗行为的关联作用形成协议争端演进路径，并具有三层演进结构；协议争端起始于项目主体间目标冲突，演变为剩余索取权冲突，最终转化为剩余控制权冲突。研究表明，PPP项目具有典型的多主体特征和较复杂的协议环境，契约不完全是引发PPP项目协议争端的重要条件；契约内权利争议是引发PPP项目协议争端的决定性条件；PPP项目协议争端治理应以三层演进结构和作用路径为治理切入点。
In order to study the path and mechanism of the contract conflict evolution of the PPP (Public-Private Partnership) project, an empirical study is carried out. This can help better understand the frequent contract conflicts in PPP projects and improve PPP project governance. 394 questionnaires were collected from contract managers in some PPP projects. The empirical test is made on the theoretical model and the research hypothesis. The results of the empirical test show that a series of contractual antagonism acts formed the contractual conflict evolution path in the incomplete contract conditions. The contractual conflicts of PPP projects have a three-tier evolutionary structure. Contract conflict starts with conflict of objectives, evolves into the residual claim conflict, and evolves into the residual control rights conflict. Research shows that there is a typical multi-agent feature and a more complex contract environment in PPP projects. The incompleteness of the contract is an important condition that causes the contract conflict of PPP projects. The rights dispute within the contract is the decisive factor that leads to the contract conflict of the PPP projects. Contract conflict governance of PPP projects should take the three-layer evolution mechanisms and the action path as the breakthrough point.
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