契约冲突治理、偶然性收益激励与履约绩效——以某航空电气项目为例
Contractual Conflict Governance, Incentives of Accidental Benefit, and Contractual Fulfillment Performance—Taking an Avionics Project as an Example

以军地合作航空电气项目为例，研究不完全契约条件下军地合作项目契约冲突演进机制，围绕基于“冲突–合作”的契约冲突治理对项目履约绩效的影响进行研究，分析军地合作项目契约冲突治理结构，同时考虑偶然性收益激励的影响并构建理论模型。通过收集军地合作项目的契约管理人员348份问卷对理论模型及研究假设进行实证检验。研究表明，军地合作项目契约冲突治理具备三层演进治理结构并与履约绩效正相关，偶然性收益激励在契约冲突治理与履约绩效关系间具有中介作用。研究确立了军地合作项目契约冲突治理体系，相关结论能够深化契约治理中关于化解契约冲突的认知，丰富履约绩效影响渠道研究，为融合项目契约主体进行契约冲突治理并提高履约绩效提供指导。
Taking the integration project contract as an example, according to the evolution mechanism of the contract conflict under incomplete contract condition, this paper researched the impact of contractual conflict governance on contractual fulfillment performance based on “Conflict-Cooperation”. The model is presented, which reflects the mechanism of contractual conflict governance. The framework of contractual conflict governance is explained, so that people can understand the internal structure of the contractual conflict governance. The theoretical model is constructed, which introduces incentives of accidental benefit as mediating variables. 348 questionnaires were recruited from contract managers in many integration projects. The empirical test of theoretical model and research hypothesis is carried out. The study argues that contractual conflict governance is positively related to contractual fulfillment performance. The incentive of accidental benefit has a mediating role in the relationship between contractual conflict governance and contractual fulfillment performance. The research establishes the three layer evolution governance system of contractual conflict governance. The conclusion of the study deepens the recognition of contractual conflict in contract governance. The research of contractual fulfillment performance is enriched. It provides the guidance for contractual conflict governance and performance improvement.