制造业企业代理问题与研发投入——基于组织冗余资源的中介作用
The Agency Problem and R&D Investment in Manufacturing Industry —Based on the Mediating Role of Organizational Redundant Resources

制造业是国家生产能力和国民经济的基础和支柱，体现社会生产力的发展水平，同时也是高技术产业化的载体和实现现代化的重要基石。我国制造业企业内部代理问题多有发生，文章探究企业代理问题对研发投入强度的影响以及组织冗余资源的中介作用，以期为制造业企业提供理论依据。文章以2017~2021年我国制造业企业上市A股的数据为样本，构建中介效应模型实证分析我国制造业企业代理问题对企业研发创新投入的影响和组织冗余资源的中介作用。实证结果表明：企业代理问题会通过组织冗余资源对企业研发投入强度产生影响，企业代理问题越严重将导致组织冗余资源减少，最终导致企业研发投入强度减小，企业如果能够妥善解决因股东与管理层矛盾引起的代理问题使得组织冗余资源增多，将使得企业研发投入强度增大，同时当企业代理问题对研发创新投入产生消极影响时，组织冗余资源能够有效缓解这种消极影响，这为制造业企业高质量发展提供理论支撑。
Manufacturing is the foundation of the national production capacity and national economic pillar, and reflects the development level of social productive forces, but also is the carrier of high tech-nology industrialization and modernization of important cornerstone. Internal agency problems of-ten occur in manufacturing enterprises in China. This paper explores the influence of agency prob-lems on R&D investment intensity and the mediating effect of organizational redundant resources, in order to provide theoretical basis for manufacturing enterprises. Based on the data of Listed A-shares of Chinese manufacturing enterprises from 2017 to 2021, this paper constructs A media-tion effect model to empirically analyze the impact of agency problems on R&D investment of Chi-nese manufacturing enterprises and the mediating role of organizational redundant resources. The empirical results show that the agency problem has an impact on R&D investment intensity through organizational redundant resources. The more serious the agency problem is, the less or-ganizational redundant resources will lead to the reduction of R&D investment intensity.