数字经济视野下经营者集中审查标准构成及探究——以初创企业并购为例
A Study of the Constituent Elements of the Thresholds of Concentrations of Undertakings in the Digital Economy—From Mergers and Acquisitions for Start-Ups

数字经济下，浪潮迭起的初创企业并购案件对当前反垄断法律法规提出了全新的挑战，系统地研究初创企业并购的审查标准成为了扭转反垄断执法困境的关键一环。在此背景下，本文对经营者集中审查的三个阶段依次展开讨论：在启动阶段，本文指出了互联网企业营业额应当增设的要素，还提出通过并购额等指标衡量并购企业的市场势力，通过研发投入密度等指标衡量目标企业的创新活力，从而灵活调整对并购案件的干涉力度；在实施阶段，本文主张以“对价化的个人信息”替代“价格”进行假定垄断者测试，根据审查时间附近的企业主要利润来源界定相关市场；在事后审查阶段，执法机构可以通过跟踪数字产品的更新迭代周期等指标判断该并购行为有无对市场经济秩序产生不利影响，以便及时补救由于数字市场的滞后性带来的假阴性错误。
In the digital economy, the boom of M&A cases for start-ups is challenging the current antitrust law and regulations and how to make the thresholds of concentrations of undertakings comply with the requirements from the development of digital economy becomes the key to solving the antitrust enforcement dilemma. Against this backdrop, this article discusses the three stages of the concentration of undertakings. First of all, at the ex-ante stage, the traditional turnover calculation model needs to be changed and it is important to flexibly select intervention options for M&A cases by measuring the market power of M&A enterprises and assessing the innovation dynamics of target enterprises. During the assessment and judgment phase, “valuation of personal information” can be used instead of “price” for a hypothetical monopolist test, like targeting the smallest relevant market by increasing the advertising time smally, significantly, non-temporarily, or defining the relevant market according to the main profit source of the enterprise in a given period. At the expost stage, legal enforcement agencies can judge whether M&A behavior has caused damage to the economic order by tracking indicators such as the turnover cycle of digital products and user satisfaction, so as to remedy the false negative errors caused by the lag of the digital market. This paper responds to the challenge of the current threshold of concentrations of undertakings from the perspective of M&A for start-ups in the digital economy, and further research and revision of traditional antitrust theories and models is necessary to resolve the theoretical and enforcement dilemmas of antitrust regulation.