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Naturalizing Semantics? Beyond Cognitive Neuro-Reductionism: From Varela’s Systemic Cognitive Neuroscience to Complex Realism Sociology

DOI: 10.4236/sm.2022.122003, PP. 29-57

Keywords: Cognitive Neuro-Reductionism, Free Will and Responsibility, Enactivism, Neurophenomenology, Complex Realism Sociology

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Is it possible to naturalize semantics? Starting from Libet’s 1983 studies, current research developments in neuronal bases of behavior reduce the mind to the brain, with significant implications in reference to issues of free will, imputability and individual behavioral responsibility. However, many criticisms can be made at this approach. This paper shows the limits of Cognitive Neuro-reductionism, especially in the light of Varela’s Systemic Cognitive Neuroscience or Neurophenomenology and the current theoretical revision process of social systems as complexdynamical, emergent and unpredictablesocial systems, or Complex Realism Sociology. Here, there is an agreement point. The conception of living systems as complex system as well as that of social system as complex systems acknowledge the autonomy of human reflexivity capability and free will be able to initiate the chain of events that triggers the process of adaptation to environment and change and social emergence ones, and, in so doing, problematize a


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