Pondering the question of free will in the context of probability allows
us to take a fresh look at a number of old problems. We are able to avoid
deterministic entrapments and attempt to look at free will as an outcome of the
entire decision-making system. In my paper, I will argue that free will should
be considered in the context of a complex system of decisions, not individual
cases. The proposed system will be probabilistic in character, so it will be
embedded in the calculus of probability. To achieve the stated goal, I will
refer to two areas of Carnap’s interest: the relationship between free will and
determinism, and the probability-based decision-making system. First, I will
present Carnap’s compatibilist position. On this basis, I will show how free
will can be examined on deterministic grounds. Then I will present Carnap’s probabilistic project—the so-called logical
interpretation of probability. In addition
to presenting its characteristics and functionality, I will argue for its
usefulness in the context of decision analysis and its immunity to problems associated with determinism. Finally, I will show
how the two mentioned elements can be
combined, as a result of which I will present a concept for a
probabilistic analysis of free will. In this context, I will identify free will
with the individual characteristics of the system. My main aim is to present
the theme of free will in the light of a formal analysis based on probability
rather than metaphysical assumptions.
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