The study
is devoted to the analysis of Russian-Turkish interaction in the Syrian
conflict under neo-realism concept. The Syrian crisis has become a kind of
Russian-Turkish relations “barometer” in recent years. On the Syrian
battlefield, Moscow and Ankara as unitary and rational actors both try to
increase their relative power, which enables them to achieve their objectives
mainly connected with prospects for national interests. The detailed analyses
of the Russian-Turkish diplomatic negotiations and dynamics of joint
military-political activities lead to the conclusion that despite competing for
military-strategic, energy and geopolitical interests, both parties opt to
jointly balance against common challenges. Being aware of the mutual necessity
and adhering to the principles of “realpolitik”, Russia and Turkey prefer to
negotiate and act within the framework of widespread interests, where real and
potential mutual benefits prevail over disagreements.
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