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Finance 2021
会计信息可比性及内部控制与商誉关系研究
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Abstract:
商誉产生于企业并购时资产评估产生的溢价。当企业的经营状况恶化,商誉就会发生大幅减值,从而放大公司股票的市场风险。而会计信息可比性则反映了企业的资产是否合理地被估计与计量,由此可以对商誉过度溢价产生抑制作用,从而降低商誉减值的程度。因此,本文对会计信息可比性对资产评估的正向影响能否反映在商誉评估中进行了实证分析。本文以2016~2019年沪深A股文化、体育与娱乐行业的上市公司为研究样本,研究会计信息可比性与商誉的关系。此外,本文还加入内部控制作为调节变量来进行检测。研究发现,会计信息可比性对商誉净值有显著的降低作用,且内部控制的调节作用显著。这一研究结论为商誉减值的产生机理提供了新的研究思路。
Goodwill arises from the premium arising from the valuation of assets at the time of a business ac-quisition. When a company's business conditions deteriorate, goodwill can be significantly impaired, thereby magnifying the market risk of the company’s shares. Comparability of accounting infor-mation, on the other hand, reflects whether a firm’s assets have been reasonably estimated and measured, which in turn can reduce the level of goodwill impairment. Therefore, this paper con-ducts an empirical analysis on whether the positive impact of accounting information comparability on asset valuation can be reflected in the valuation of goodwill. This paper takes listed companies in the culture, sports and entertainment industry in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2016~2019 as the research sample to study the relationship between accounting information comparability and goodwill. In addition, this paper adds internal control as a moderating variable to test this. It was found that comparability of accounting information had a significant reducing ef-fect on the net value of goodwill, and the moderating effect of internal control was significant. This finding provides a new research idea on the mechanism of goodwill impairment.
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