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Finance  2021 

高管薪酬激励与管理层行为文献综述
Literature Review of Executive Compensation Incentive and Management Behavior

DOI: 10.12677/FIN.2021.113017, PP. 147-153

Keywords: 高管薪酬激励,盈余管理,投资效率,会计信息质量
Executive Salary Incentives
, Earnings Management, Investment Efficiency,Accounting Information Quality

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Abstract:

本文对国内外关于高管薪酬激励与管理层行为关系的文献研究主要从盈余管理、投资效率以及会计信息质量三个角度进行分析。包括探究货币薪酬与股权薪酬对高管行为的影响,加入企业所有制性质、高管权力占比、行业规模、行业类型,审计质量等因素进行进一步分析比较,为判断高管薪酬激励与管理层行为之间的关系提供经验证据。
In this paper, the domestic and foreign research on the relation between executive compensation incentive and management behavior literature research mainly from the surplus management, in-vestment efficiency and the quality of accounting information is analyzed from the three. Including explore monetary compensation and the influence of equity compensation for executive behavior, to join the enterprise ownership, of executive power, industry scale, industry type, audit quality factors for further analysis and comparison, to determine the relationship between executive com-pensation incentive and management behavior to provide empirical evidence.

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