With the current economic and social development of
the country, the conservation of historic buildings has brought new issues; historic buildings need to
be conserved and activated. Effective incentive management to promote economic
development and the preservation of historic buildings is an important issue. Through
the study of analysis strategy of the participants and decision-making of urban
historic buildings conservation, game theory explains incentive management from
a historic buildings activated conservation development perspective of the
demand and supply side design to conserve the historic buildings. Based on the
three major stakeholders in the conservation process of historic buildings, an
evolutionary game model of “government-developers” and “government-the people”
is constructed to study the strategy selection behaviors of the government in
the implementation of incentive policies. Developers and the people put forward
the strategy suggestions to achieve optimal equilibrium. The results show that
the strategy choice is affected by the initial state and parameters of the game.
The government through subsidies, market mechanism intervention measures guides of developers to activate
and protect historic buildings; The government promotes public awareness
through economic encouragement and propaganda, participates in the conservation of historic buildings, and finally realizes the win-win situation of
the three parties.
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