The Problem of A priority of Time and Space in Kant

One of the most controversial issues suggested by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason is the claim that time and space is a priori. Kant sees this claim as the ultimate solution to the problems caused by Newtonian and Leibnizian conceptions of time and space. In this respect, the claim of a priority of time-space is central to the epistemic and metaphysical problems that Kant aims to solve. However, as in Kant’s other claims, there are different interpretations of what he meant with the claim of a priority of time and space. This is mainly due to Kant’s statements allowing different interpretations. In this context, it can be mentioned three different interpretations about what Kant meant by time-space being a priori. The first of them is the interpretation of temporal priority which suggests that form of time and space precede the objects of experience. The second is the interpretation of logical priority which asserts that the a priority of time and space represents a priority such as piece-whole relationship. The last one is the interpretation of ‘negative a priority’, which suggest that a priority is in the sense of not being a posteriori. Undoubtedly, the examination of these interpretations in terms of their correctness and consistency has an important place in understanding the basic theses of critical philosophy