al-Ghazal？ on the Ontological Nature of Knowledge

It is unavoidable for the studies which trace the conceptual-theoretical evolution and transformation in Islamic thought after Avicenna to refer to al-Ghazal？ in a certain way. al-Ghazal？’s challange to the peripatetic Islamic philosophy left three basic controversies concerned with ontology, psychology and epistemology to the philosophical theology of the mutaahhir？n period : Causality, abstract soul and mental existence. The fact that the idea of abstract soul became part of the Islamic philosophical theology after the reception brings the question of whether the theory of knowledge takes its share from this change to the mind. This article, which explore the question of whether al-Ghazal？ carried the transformation in the theory of soul to the theory of knowledge, aims to base two claims: ？. Taking into account only the conceptual framework used by al-Ghazal？ who accepts the view that the soul is a abstract substance, it is incorrect to evaluate his ideas with reference to the mental existence. ？？. The concepts used by Ghazal？ give the impression that he is close to accepting image theory. On the other hand, he prefers the treatment which regards knowledge as a kind of unveiling (inki？af) as he adopts the view that it is diffucult to make an exact definiton of knowledge that consists of genre and difference. In this regard, firstly we will deal al-Ghazal？’s treatment of abstract soul briefly and after then will provide justifications for claims in question in the context of knowledge and universals