The Subject Matter of Logic from Abū Bishr Matta？ to Avicenna: Vocal Forms or Second Intelligibles?

In this article, my analysis will show that Avicenna’s doctrine of “the second intelligibles” was posited as a response to an ongoing debate about the relationship between logic and grammar. Apparently, the logician and philosopher al-Matta？’s (d. 328/940) defense of logic against the grammarian al-Sīra？fī (d. 365/977) in the debate on the subject, which emerged one generation prior to Avicenna, did not satisfy the subsequent members of Baghda？d’s philosophy school. After this debate, the prominent members of this school, such as al-Fa？ra？bī (d. 338/950), Ya？ya？ ibn ‘Adī (d. 362/974), Abū Sulayma？n al-Sijista？nī (d. c. 380/991) and Abū al-Faraj Ibn al-？ayyib (d. 435/1044), introduced new arguments to this debate that strengthened the position of logicians against grammarians. They clarified the position of logic as they asserted that the subject matter of logic is distinct from that of grammar. To achieve this, the logicians of the Baghda？d school pointed to the difference between logicians and grammarians in dealing with vocal forms, indicating that logicians deal with “the universal meanings and the expressions insofar as they signify universal meanings.” This is contrary to the grammarians who are concerned with the expressions without focusing on their universal meanings. It appears that al-Fa？ra？bī and his pupil Ya？ya？ ibn ‘Adī devoted extra effort to elaborating upon their approaches regarding the distinctness of logic from grammar. In his distinctive work on the classification of sciences, Ih？a？’ al-‘ulūm, al-Fa？ra？bī accords grammar and the other linguistic sciences a special place in his system. Furthermore, he meticulously separates logic and language in terms of their subject matters when considering the relationship between them. Following a similar line of thought, his pupil Ya？ya？ ibn ‘Adī penned a special treatise on the differentiation of logic and grammar, titled, al-Fa？l bayna ？ina？‘atay al-man？iq al-falsafī wa’l-na？w al-‘Arabī. In this work, he defines both disciplines in terms of their purposes and subject matters and then argues that logic, unlike grammar, examines universal meanings and their vocal forms; however, it does not deal with vocal forms in a similar manner to grammar. For Ya？ya？ ibn ‘Adī, logic and grammar are different disciplines because their subject matters are distinct. Still, vocal forms or expressions remain the subject matter of logic in their works. Even the last member of logicians of the Baghda？d school, Abū’l-Faraj Ibn al-？ayyib, says in his commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge that “the subject matter of the art