God and Ultimateness in al-Fārābī

God and Ultimateness in al-Fārābī One of our basic ontological/metaphysical intuitions about God is the idea that God is the ultimate ground and ultimate causal explanation of all reality. However the idea of ultimateness is considered as necessary for a reasonable conception of God, it is hard to claim that this necessary condition is a sufficient one as well. One of the reasons for this is that the concept of ultimateness is far from providing a substantional conception. This paper discusses whether or not the concept of ultimateness is sufficient to constitute an appropriate and satisfactory conception of God with respect to al-Fārābī’s idea of the First Cause. In order to explain the nature of God, al-Fārābī ascribes some attributes to God, and he explains these attributes within the framework of ultimateness. However, as the conception of God, which is limited by this formal framework, does not seem satisfactory, it also does not seem compatible with the theistic concept of God. In contrast to al-Fārābī’s idea of the First Cause, the theistic conception of God is developed by the concept of perfection, and it does not only implies ultimateness but also puts forward a substantional idea of God. Given the fact that al-Fārābī’s understanding of God and ultimateness differs from theism’s understanding significantly, it seems possible to claim that al-Fārābī’s idea of the First Cause/God is not compatible with the theistic idea of Go