Deconstruction of Ibn Sīnā’s Essence-Existence Distinction and the Essence of the Necessary Existent

Ibn Sīnā’s establishment of the distinction between essence and existence in line with certain epistemological considerations led him to advance the novel idea of an essence-in-itself. This is distinguished from universal and particular essences in order to provide a bridge between logic and science that will ground the validity and, indeed, possibility of knowledge. However, this same concept poses a number of problems regarding Ibn Sīnā’s famous identification of the Necessary Existent. Among other things, Ibn Sīnā’s intriguing hesitation on whether to grant the Necessary Existent an essence or not has split commentators vis-à-vis essentialist and existentialist readings of his metaphysics. This paper argues that neither position is correct as the problems associated with the Necessary Existent are inherently intractable from within the current framework. Rather, upon deconstructive criticism and consequent revisions of Ibn Sīnā’s concept of the essence-in-itself, a resolution to the matter of the Necessary Existent is permitted while maintaining the bridge between logic and science