A Preliminary Design-Phase Security Methodology for Cyber–Physical Systems

Abstract Despite “cyber” being in the name, cyber–physical systems possess unique characteristics that limit the applicability and suitability of traditional cybersecurity techniques and strategies. Furthermore, vulnerabilities to cyber–physical systems can have significant safety implications. The physical and cyber interactions inherent in these systems require that cyber vulnerabilities not only be defended against or prevented, but that the system also be resilient in the face of successful attacks. Given the complex nature of cyber–physical systems, the identification and evaluation of appropriate defense and resiliency strategies must be handled in a targeted and systematic manner. Specifically, what resiliency strategies are appropriate for a given system, where, and which should be implemented given time and/or budget constraints? This paper presents two methodologies: (1) the cyber security requirements methodology and (2) a systems-theoretic, model-based methodology for identifying and prioritizing appropriate resiliency strategies for implementation in a given system and mission. This methodology is demonstrated using a case study based on a hypothetical weapon system. An assessment and comparison of the results from the two methodologies suggest that the techniques presented in this paper can augment and enhance existing systems engineering approaches with model-based evidence. View Full-Tex