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Modern Economy 2021

Recovery and Resolution Regimes in the Banking Union

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121009, PP. 174-193

Mejra Festi？, Anita Pe？a, Marko Lukavac

Keywords: Recovery, Resolution, Banking Union, Bail-In

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Abstract:

This paper explores the implications of European Union (EU) legal regulations on approaches to tackling crisis situations in the financial sector. It explains the role and mechanisms of EU institutions in the process of monitoring and recovery of strategically important financial entities inside banking union at the EU level as well as of central bank members of the countries of the banking union. The purpose of the paper is to examine the compliance of EU regulations with national legislation in order to achieve preventive conditions of possible future crises and to protect national economies and the economy of the entire EU in context of the spillover effect and risks arising from the need of banks recovery due to realized losses of the same. The results evince the implementation of EU directives in the national legislation comprehensively, but practice demonstrated that the implementation of the same ones resulted in additional problems that require further EU institutions action and, in addition, different interpretations, i.e. evaluation of directives such as so-called “public interest”, results in discrepancy of approaches in managing open crisis situations.

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