Constitutional limits on the delegation of legislative power to independent administrative authorities

Sa？etak In the light of the growing reconsideration of the constitutional status of our independent regulators, it is becoming necessary to closely examine the constitutional limits on the delegation of normative powers to such bodies, as well as the impact of these limits on their overall position in the structure of State power. The realisation of some fundamental constitutional principles such as separation of powers, national sovereignty, democracy and the rule of law is unequivocally linked to the determination of clear constitutional limits on legislative delegation to such authorities, i.e. the determination of a constitutionally permissible scope of discretion in the exercise of such regulatory power. The overall scope of regulatory power which legislature can delegate to independent administrative authorities, as well as the overall position of regulatory authorities in the structure of government, directly depends on such constitutional limits. This paper seeks to provide a clear overview of the constitutional limits of the delegation of legislative power to independent administrative authorities in the Anglo-Saxon and Continental legal systems, and of the way such limits arise from positive constitutional norms, constitutional jurisprudence and prevailing constitutional doctrine. Particular emphasis is placed on examples from the United States and Germany, which represent two opposite approaches to regulatory authorities and the scope of their delegated powers, both of which have been applied in Croatia to various degrees. In conclusion, this paper analyses the constitutional doubts caused by the specificities of the Croatian "hybrid" system of independent regulators and seeks to provide some specific normative solutions to these doubts