Intuitions as Invitations

Sa？etak Recently, there has been a great deal of skepticism about appeals to intuitions in philosophy. Appeals to intuition often get expressed in the form of what ‘we’ believe. Many people take the ‘we’ in this context to refer to what the folk believe. So the claim about what we believe is an empirical claim. And it looks like the support for this claim comes from a biased sample consisting solely of analytic philosophers. In this paper I want to explain a different way appeals to intuition are used in the literature and why it survives such attacks. The basic idea, which comes from Bernard Williams, is that the 'we' used in many appeals to intuitions is not a referring expression at all. The appeal to intuition is not a claim about what any group of individuals believes. Rather it is an invitation to make a judgment. I argue that when you hear a philosopher say 'P is what we intuitively believe' the proper response is not 'who is this 'we'?’ The proper response is to wonder whether one ought to accept P