Can Social Constructivism Save Scientific Mysterianism and Nativism from the Charges of Inconsistency?

Sa？etak In this paper, I argue that Colin McGinn provides an unacceptable account of consciousness due to the inconsistencies between (1) the conjunction of the metaphysical assumptions of his nativism and the epistemic assumptions of his mysterianism and (2) his conception of identity. I also maintain that, although John Searle’s social constructivism may provide the most feasible counter-argument to these charges of inconsistency, Searle’s position cannot save McGinn’s account of consciousness due to the inadequacies of Searle’s version of external realism. As I see it, the only means to address the problems in McGinn’s and Searle’s views is by revising their version of external realism. I demonstrate that this is only possible if they adopt an external realist position that dispenses with direct realism and adopts physicalism. I maintain that this is the only means by which we can prove the existence of consciousness while at the same time accommodating its a priori and a posteriori character