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Finance 2020
金融信息扭曲、股权集中度与企业投资效率
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Abstract:
投资决策是企业财务决策的核心,是企业实现规模扩大和可持续发展的重要基础。投资效率的高低在一定程度上体现了投资决策结果的好坏,高效率的投资可以提高企业资源配置效率,提升企业业绩和价值。而金融信息扭曲是一种普遍的财务现象,反映出企业资金效率被严重低估,财务风险则被严重高估,那么它能否起到引导企业提高其投资效率的作用呢?股权集中的现象在我国上市公司中普遍存在,金融信息扭曲与投资效率之间的关系是否受到股权集中度的影响呢?这是亟待业界深入探究和解决的问题。故本文选取了2014~2018年我国沪深两市A股上市公司作为研究对象,实证研究了金融信息扭曲对投资效率的影响机制,同时考察了股权集中度对二者相关关系的作用效果。研究发现:金融信息扭曲与企业投资效率确实存在显著消极影响,其中资金效率扭曲对投资不足和过度投资均有负面效用,财务风险扭曲不仅会加剧投资不足,股权集中度弱化了资金效率扭曲对非效率投资的加剧作用,同时也削弱了财务风险扭曲对非效率投资的促进效用。本文的研究结论具有十分重要的现实意义,为有关部门调整财务分析体系以反应金融信息真实水平来优化资本市场的资本配置提供了经验证据,有助于上市公司重视金融信息质量和股权结构的优化,为企业提高资本配置效率提供理论支持。
Investment decision-making is the core of an enterprise’s financial decision-making and an impor-tant basis for an enterprise to achieve scale expansion and sustainable development. The level of investment efficiency reflects the quality of investment decisions to a certain extent. High-efficiency investment can improve the efficiency of enterprise resource allocation and enhance corporate performance and value. The distortion of financial information is a common financial phenomenon, reflecting that the capital efficiency of enterprises is seriously underestimated and financial risks are seriously overestimated, so can it play a role in guiding enterprises to improve their investment efficiency? The phenomenon of equity concentration is common in listed companies in China. Is the relationship between financial information distortion and investment efficiency affected by equity concentration? This is a problem that needs to be thoroughly explored and resolved by the industry. Therefore, this paper selects the A-share listed companies in China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2014 to 2018 as the research object, and empirically studies the influence mechan-ism of financial information distortion on investment efficiency, and examines the effect of equity concentration on the correlation between the two. The study found that financial information dis-tortion and corporate investment efficiency do have significant negative effects. Among them, capi-tal efficiency distortion has negative effects on underinvestment and overinvestment. Financial risk distortion only exacerbates underinvestment; equity concentration weakens capital efficiency dis-tortion. The aggravating effect of efficient investment also weakens the promotion effect of financial risk distortion on inefficient investment. The research conclusions of this paper have very im-portant practical significance, and provide empirical evidence for relevant departments to adjust the financial analysis system to reflect the true level of financial information to
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