The Persistence of the Power Elite: Presidential Cabinets and Corporate Interlocks, 1968–2018

In his seminal text, The Power Elite, C. Wright Mills initially drew critical attention to U.S. state power, asserting that economic, political, and military elites flow through a revolving door, cycling in and out of positions of power. Following its publication, several social scientists began to examine the nature of the U.S. state, including individuals like G. William Domhoff and Michael Useem. One particular work by Peter Freitag examined the class composition of presidential cabinets. Freitag examined whether presidential cabinet members came from the elite corporate sphere, went into the elite corporate sphere following their tenure in office, the extent of interlocks among the Democratic and Republican Parties, and whether particular cabinet positions were more interlocked with the elite corporate sphere than others. In this article, I examine these same questions, looking at presidential cabinets between 1968 and 2018, that is, across the last half-century. In doing so, I find consistency with many of Freitag’s initial findings: most presidential cabinets remain heavily interlocked, there is little difference between Democratic and Republican cabinets, and there is a significant amount of cabinet members that come from and enter the elite corporate sphere following their time in office