Obviously without foundation: Discretion and the identification of clearly abusive asylum applicants

This article looks at how asylum examiners in Brazil account for their ability to identify asylum applications they see as clearly abusive. The argument highlights a proclivity in examiners’ talk to shift discursive registers, from law and evidence to psychological and social bias, when talking about identifications they agree and do not agree with. This way of talking, it is argued, allows examiners to treat the refusal of clearly abusive claims as self-explanatory, while also acknowledging discretion as an inescapable feature of asylum decision-making. By relying on this ambiguous style of speaking truth, which portrays the outcome of claims as both dependent on and free of discretion, Brazilian examiners accrue authority to their views. Decisions to deny clearly abusive claims are rendered reasonable, in spite of barely being accounted for. What is worse, register-shifting kills the drive to ask what makes these denials so obvious by making the very question sound absurd