The incommensurability of emergence and modularity in complex systems: A comment on Wastell (2014)

To answer the interaction problem, dual-process theories of reasoning must explain how seemingly disparate reasoning systems affect each other and underlie the apparent unity of subjective experience. Wastell (2014) proposes complex emergence modular theory, which asserts that complex virtual reasoning modules emerge from basic reasoning modules. We contend that Wastell’s proposal fails to address the interaction problem. First, we claim that the attempt to integrate emergence with virtual modules proliferates the interaction problem instead of solving it. Second, we argue that there is no interaction problem in human reasoning if “emergence” is employed in accordance with typical applications of complex systems theory in cognitive science and psychology. Alternatively, we suggest that in order to understand human reasoning within a complex systems framework, researchers should forego conceiving of reasoning as informationally encapsulated modular systems, and instead investigate system state transitions