National gambling policies and the containment of the EU’s politico

Research has shown that the EU’s politico-legal influence over member states is contained through two political strategies: contained compliance and anticipatory obedience. Previous studies on gambling policies in the EU have quite uncritically presumed that the EU is capable of inducing changes, or even forcing changes, in national gambling policies. In this article, the objective was to investigate whether member states have adopted the two strategies allowing a containment of the EU’s influence on their national gambling policies. The politico-legal influence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Commission on national gambling policy is analysed in the case of Finnish monopoly-based gambling policy. The analysis is based on case law and policy documents. The results indicate that Finland has adopted both anticipatory obedience and contained compliance when striving to safeguard its gambling monopoly system. Contained compliance was adopted during the early period of Finland’s accession (1995–2001). Anticipatory obedience was exercised between the years 2004 and 2013, a period characterised by several critical legal cases and the infringement procedure commenced by the European Commission against Finland. During the third period (2014-2017), when the merger of three monopoly operators into a single state-owned company was on the agenda, neither strategy was adopted, indicating little EU influence (despite public justifications of the same). The EU’s opportunities to induce changes in the gambling policies of member states should not be overemphasised because member states are able to contain the EU’s politico-legal influence. Future analyses of national gambling policies in the EU would benefit from taking the interaction between member states and the EU into account