The Policy of the Military “Supporting the Left” and the Spread of Factional Warfare in China’s Countryside: Shaanxi, 1967–1968

The role of the People’s Liberation Army in Cultural Revolution conflicts in China’s provinces, necessitated by the policy of “supporting the left” in early 1967, has been understudied. Using county- and prefectural-level data, this article shows that rural factional warfare spread not because of clashes between factions backed by the Central Cultural Revolution Group and those supported by regional military forces, as an influential view posits, but because of regional military paralysis. The elusive and divisive policy called for rigorous coordination among regional forces, which in turn required clear guidance and leadership from higher authorities. This was especially true for the regional forces whose close-knit ties to local party leadership made them susceptible to local influence and also vulnerable to rebel attacks. But central authorities’ attempt to impose their will on the higher reaches of the regional military bureaucracy left mid- and low-level commands without direction, leading them to indecision and disunity. Rebels took advantage of local military paralysis, looting weapons and waging factional warfare